34Tn  Congress,  } 
1st  Session,  j 


SENATE. 


Ex.  Doc. 
No.  36. 


REPORT 

or 

THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 

IS  COMPLIANCE  WITH 

A  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  llth  ultimo,  calling  for  information 
relative  to  the  fortifications  necessary  for  the  proper  defence  of  New 
York  and  Brooklyn. 


Maach  3,  1856. — Read,  referred  tu  the  Committee  on  Military  Atiairs,  and  ordered  to  be 

printed. 


War  Department, 
Washington,  March  1,  1856. 

Sir:  In  answer  to  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  February  11, 
1856,  "That  the  Secretary  of  War  be  requested  to  report  to  the 
Senate  whether  any,  and,  if  any,  what  additional  fortifications  are 
necessary  for  the  proper  defence  and  })rotection  of  the  city  and  harbor 
of  New  York,  and  of  the  navy  yard  and  public  property  at  Brooklyn," 
I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  additional  ibrtifications  are  necessary 
for  the  objects  specified  in  the  resolution. 

Before  attempting  to  designate  the  permanent  works  which  it  is 
deemed  proper  to  construct,  I  will  premise  that  the  great  purpose  of 
fortification  in  this  case  is  to  prevent  a  hostile  fleet  from  approaching 
the  city,  and  thus  to  compel  the  enemy  to  land  his  forces  in  order  to 
attack.  With  this  view,  the  fortifications  originally  constructed  in 
the  harbor  of  New  York  have  long  been  neglected,  and  our  attention 
has  been  concentrated  upon  erecting  impassable  barriers  on  the  two 
great  avenues  of  approach  from  the  sea  to  the  city.  For  this  pur- 
pose two  points  were  selected,  one  about  seven  miles  from  the  city, 
at  the  Narrows,  on  the  southern  or  main  channel,  and  the  other 
about  sixteen  miles  from  tiie  city,  at  Throg's  Neck,  at  the  entrance 
into  East  river,  from  Long  Island  sound.  If  these  be  made  impass- 
able to  a  hostile  fleet,  the  necessities  resulting  from  a  land  attack  may 
be  left  without  much  apprehension  to  the  resources  which  will  always 
be  at  command  whenever  such  an  occasion  shall  arise,  and  it  is  not 
believed  to  be  claiming  too  much  for  the  patriotism,  the  skill,  and 
the  valor  of  our  people  to  suppose,  that  wherever  they  can  be  arrayed 
in  s\ich  numbers  as  at  the  city  of  New  York,  an  invading  army  will  ^ 
have  to  choose  between  the  alternative  of  captivity  or  a  grave. 


2  FORTIFICATIONS  FOR  THE  PROrEU 

OSS 

A  Rccond  or  exterior  line  of  (lerenco,  though  not  considered  neces- 
sary ibr  the  city  ofKew  York,  lias  rehitions  to  its  commerce,  to  inter- 
nal communication,  and  tlie  naval  o])erations  of  the  United  8tate«, 
in  connexion  with  the  harbor  of  Mew  York,  such  as  })robably  to 
bring  it  withiu  the  ]mr|;ose  of  the  resolution,  and  it  w-ill  tlierelbre  be 
treated  of  in  this  rejjort.  Proceeding,  then,  to  consider  the  various 
works  in  the  order  of  their  relative  importance,  I  would  recommend, 
first,  the  com])letion  of  the  works  now  under  construction  at  Statin 
Island,  and  the  rebuilding  of  Fort  Tompkins.  Second,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  fort  on  Wilkins'  Point,  o})posite  Fort  Schuyler  on  Tbrog's 
Keck.  Third,  the  completion  and  rei)air  of  the  works  in  the  harbor 
of  New  York.  Fourth,  the  construction  of  the  Ibrt  on  Sandy  Hook  ; 
and  filth,  the  const nicl ion  of  works  on  the  shoals  beyond  it,  should 
it  be  found  i)racticable  to  erect  them  at  reasonable  cost. 

Directing  our  attention  to  the  main  channel,  we  find  at  the  Narrowis, 
seven  miles  I'rom  the  lower  part  of  the  city,  the  first  position  on  this 
avenue  of  approach  susceptible  of  such  defence  by  ibrtifications  as 
com])letcly  to  close  it  against  an  enemy's  fleet,  and  fulfil  all  tlie  re- 
quirements of  the  first  and  great  object  of  deience  and  ])rotection  to 
the  city  and  harbor.  Here,  ibr  the  space  of  a  mile,  the  channel  is 
about  a  mile  wide.  Favorable  as  this  position  is,  yet  it  possesses  the 
disadvantage  (in  connexion  with  the  object  in  view)  of  deep  water 
from  shore  to  shore,  and,  being  straight,  admits  the  passage  of  ships 
of  the  greatest  draught  at  all  hours  of  the  day  and  night,  in  every  con- 
dition of  the  tide,  with  all  the  rapidity  that  their  means  of  propul- 
sion can  impart.  This  position  was  selected  as  accomplishing,  at 
comparatively  small  cost,  the  first  and  great  object  in  view.  Of  the 
permanent  works  proposed  for  this  end,  those  finished  are  Forts  Ham- 
ilton and  La'ayette  on  the  Long  Island  side  of  the  channel,  and  batte- 
ries Hudson  and  Morton  on  Staten  Island.  To  complete  the  defences, 
there  remain  on  Staten  Island  the  comjiletion  of  Fort  Richmond, 
which  is  under  construction,  and  the  erection  of  Fort  Tojnpkins,  on 
the  site  of  the  ruins  of  the  fort  of  that  name  begun  in  1810  by  the 
State  of  New  York.  When  all  these  permanent  works  are  finished, 
they  will,  with  the  additional  temporary  batteries  and  works  to  be 
thrown  up  when  hostilities  are  imminent,  effectually  close  this  chan- 
nel of  approach. 

The  deience  of  this  important  position  from  an  attack  by  water  being 
incomplete,  the  construction  of  Fort  Richmond  and  of  Fort  Tompkijna 
claim  attention  first,  and  their  erection  should  precede  that  of  all  other 
works. 

These  ibrtifications,  in  addition  to  protecting  the  city  and  harbor  of 
New  York  against  an  attack  by  water,  on  the  southern  avenue  of 
approach,  limit  to  the  beach  of  Uravesend  bay,  less  than  two  miles  in 
extent,  any  attempt  to  land  a  hostile  army  under  cover  of  a  fleet  on 
that  part  of  Long  Island  which  can  be  approached  by  water,  from  the 
roadstead  between  the  Narrows  and  Sandy  Hook.  The  water  is  slioal 
along  the  whole  of  this  beach  and  does  not  admit  the  approach  of  a 
fleet  nearer  than  one  mile  to  the  shore.  The  erection  of  temporary 
batteries  and  other  defensive  woiks  must,  under  such  circumstancea, 
deieat  any  attempt  to  land,  even  supposing  no  aid  or  diversipn  fr.om 


DEFENCE  OF  NEW  YORK  AND  BROOKLYN. 


3 


the  water  side.  PiVen  tlic  heaviest  guns  of  t'le  fl3et,  at  the  distance 
of  a  mile,  coiihl  not  destroy  the  batteries  nor  drive  out  the  forces  occu- 
pying them. 

The  advantage  would  be  si  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  repealing  force, 
the  exposure  of  the  enemy  in  crowded  boats  wouhl  be  so  great,  that 
the  result  to  him  must  be  disastrous  de!cat.  No  other  position  could 
he  so  favorable  to  us  for  foiling  such  an  enterprise.  The  proximity  to 
the  Narrows  and  Brooklyn,  the  latter  eight  miles  distant,  and  the 
distance  from  the  shore  at  which  the  fleet  must  lie,  renders  it  vastly 
stronger  than  a  more  distant  landing  place,  which  would,  doubtless, 
be  sought  in  pre'erence  by  an  enemy,  either  on  the  south  shore  of 
Long  Island,  outside  t!ie  roadstead,  or  in  Long  Island  sound. 

The  introduction  of  steam  into  naval  warfare  has  greatly  increased 
the  facilities  and  probabilities  of  an  attack  by  water  by  Long  Island 
sound.  The  East  river  affords  i)ositions  susceptible  of  strong  defence. 
The  best,  having  in  view  all  the  ends  to  be  attained,  is  at  the  narrow 
entrance  from  Long  Island  sound,  sixteen  miles  from  the  lower  part 
of  the  city.  The  i)lan  of  de'ence  for  this  position  j)roposed  the  erec- 
tion oi'two  works,  one  on  each  side  of  the  channel.  That  on  Throg's 
Neck — Fort  Schuyler,  a  powerful  work — is  nearly  completed.  The 
fort  proposed  to  be  erecte  1  opposite  to  Fort  Schuyler,  on  Long  Island, 
has  not  yet  been  commencad,  and  its  prompt  construction  is  recom- 
mended in  order  to  complete  the  Recurity  from  an  attack  on  New  York 
by  water  from  this  direction. 

These  two  works  will  not  only  accom])lish  the  first  and  principal 
object  sought  for  in  the  defence  and  protection  of  New  York,  but  will 
aid  materially  in  preventing  an  attack  by  land,  the  bearing  they  have 
upon  such  an  enterprise  being  clearly  shown  in  the  report  of  Brigadier 
General  Totten,  chief  engineer. 

The  great  strength  of  Fort  Schuyler,  and  the  narrowness  of  the 
channel  way  luidei'  its  gnns,  renders  the  defence  at  this  point  proba- 
bly more  secure  than  that  by  the  main  or  southern  channel,  in  the 
present  condition  of  the  works  there,  and  if  appropriations  are  not 
made  at  the  same  time  for  the  additional  fortifications  required  on 
both  channels,  that  for  the  works  on  the  principal  avenue  should  be 
made  first. 

The  works  in  the  harbor  of  New  York  bavin"'  already  been  con- 
structed,  should  be  kept  in  repair  and  maintained  in  the  condition 
proposed  by  the  chief  engineei*  until  the  completion  of  the  exterior 
barriers  shall  have  removed  the  possibility  of  an  enemy's  fleet  entering 
the  harbor. 

The  completion  of  the  works  just  enumerated  in  the  manner  recom- 
mended by  Brigadier  General  Totten,  chief  engineer,  whose  report  to 
this  department  upon  the  subject  of  the  re^^olution  is  annexed  to 
this  communication,  together  with  such  temporary  batteries  and  field 
works  as  can  be  thrown  up  when  hostilities  are  threatened,  will,  it  is 
believed,  eftectually  protect  the  city  of  New  York,  the  numerous  ship- 
ping in  its  harbor,  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  the  navy  yard,  and  other 
public  property  there,  from  an  attack  by  a  fleet.  They  do  not  dis- 
pense with  the  necessity,  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  of  a  strong  land 
force  on  Long  Island,  nor  the  occu])ation  of  lines  of  defence  on  that 


4 


FORTIFICATIONS  FOR  THE  PROPER 


island,  and  defensive  arrangements  to  prevent  a  landing.  Nor  can 
any  system  of  defence  by  fortification  or  other  means  dispense  with 
them. 

The  entrances  to  the  admirable  roadstead  between  the  Narrows 
and  Sandy  Hook  are  entirely  without  defence.  Its  occupation  by  an 
enemy's  fleet,  to  which  it  is  now  open,  would  completely  seal  this 
outlet  of  the  port  of  New  York  ;  would  interrupt  the  interior  water 
communication  with  the  Delaware;  would  give  him  great  advantages 
in  cruising  off  the  port  against  our  shipping,  both  mercantile  and 
military,  and  would  deprive  our  navy  of  all  the  advantages  to  be 
derived  from  its  use  for  similar  purposes.  These;  objects,  however 
desirable  to  be  gained,  may  properly  be  considered  as  ulterior  to  the 
protection  of  the  city  from  attack  by  water  and  land. 

To  secure  this  roadstead  to  our  own  use,  and  to  prevent  the  losses 
and  hazards  following  its  occupation  by  an  enemy,  the  entrance  must 
be  closed  by  forts  suitably  placed  upon  the  shoals  adjoining  the  chan- 
nels in  advance  of  Sandy  Hook,  and  upon  the  extremity  of  that  point. 
In  many  respects  the  general  position  just  designated  is  the  best  for 
attaining  the  objects  sought,  in  fortifying  the  Narrows,  since  a  fleet 
can  attempt  to  pass  it  only  in  the  day  and  during  a  flood  tide  ;  and  as 
the  ships  must  necessarily  move  slowly  and  cautiously  through  the 
channels,  (except  ])ast  the  extremity  of  the  Hook,)  they  Avould  be  a 
long  time  under  fire,  and  would  fight  under  the  disadvantages  of  a 
divided  attention  during  that  time,  they  could  not  attempt  to  pass 
the  forts  before  silencing  them.  But  from  the  number  of  channels 
and  the  character  of  the  works  on  the  shoals^  the  complete  defence  oi" 
this  position  would  be  very  costly. 

With  the  view  of  keeping  out  an  enemy  from  the  roadstead  and 
securing  it  to  our  own  use,  and  to  prevent  an  attempt  to  land  at  Grave- 
send  Bay,  the  board  of  engineers  projected  two  works  on  these  shoals 
in  addition  to  the  temporary  woi  k  to  be  erected  on  Sandy  Hook  upon 
the  commencement  of  hostilities.  But  surveys  subsequent  to  that 
time  have  made  known  a  channel  of  greater  capacity  than  the  two 
ship  channels  then  used;  and  repeated  minute  surveys  since  afford,  in 
the  language  of  Gen.  Totten,  "  so  many  reasons  to  doubt  the  stability 
of  these  shoals  that  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  confine  the  projects 
for  defence  to  Sandy  Hook,  it  being  proposed  to  erect  thereon  a  strong 
permanent  fortification."  But  this  work,  with  the  batteries  afloat 
and  ashore  under  its  protection,  would  secure,  in  an  imperfect  and 
partial  manner,  the  objects  for  which  the  forts  on  the  shoals  were 
originally  planned.  The  defence  can  only  be  made  thorough  by  the 
erection  of  works  upon  the  shoals  as  well  as  the  Hook.  The  character 
of  the  changes  to  which  they  are  probably  subjected  will  doubtless  in- 
crease the  cost  of  their  erection,  but  it  remains  yet  to  be  determined, 
by  further  investigation,  whether  to  such  an  extent  as  to  require  the 
abandonment  of  the  plan.  It  is  highly  probable,  from  the  indications 
of  the  charts  in  use  seventy  or  eighty  years  ago,  that  the  new  or 
Gedney's  channel  was  then  known  to  exist. 

Tlie  clianges  which  have  taken  place  in  the  nature  of  marine  war- 
fare by  the  introduction  of  steam  and  the  increased  power  of  the  arma- 
ment of  ships,  bring  into  importance  channels  which  were  before  c^)m- 


DEFENCE  OF  NEW  YORK   AND  BROOKLYN. 


5 


paratively  insignificant  in  tlieir  bearing  upon  defence.  Steamships  of 
fifty  guns,  twenty  guns  and  less,  with  draughts  of  twenty-three  feet, 
twenty  feet  and  less,  liave  armaments  of  the  same  calibre  as  the  steam- 
ships of  one  hundred  and  one  hundred  and  thirty  guns.  Formerly 
fleets  were  composed  principally  of  ships-of-the-line,  the  frigates 
accompanying  them  occupying  very  much  the  same  relative  position 
as  light  infantry  to  an  army. 

But  now  fleets  may  be  formed  of  these  lighter  draught  steamships, 
which,  in  the  nature  of  their  armament,  are,  for  many  purposes, 
elevated  to  the  position  of  line-of-])attle  ships.  Frigates,  too,  now 
carry  heavier  guns  than  ships-of-the-line  formerly,  and  hence  it  is 
scarcely  less  important  to  close  the  frigate  channels  than  those  of  the 
100-gun  ships. 

Since,  according  to  the  coast  survey  chart  of  New  York  bay  and 
harbor,  published  in  1845,  steam  and  sail  ships  of  the  rates  mentioned 
may  enter  the  roadstead  between  the  Narrows  and  Sandy  Hook  by  the 
swash  channel,  witiiout  approaching  the  proposed  fort  on  the  Hook 
nearer  than  two  miles,  and  while  lying  out  of  reach  of  the  fire  of  this 
fort  and  that  of  the  works  at  the  Narrows,  effect  many  of  the  objects 
which  the  work  on  Sandy  Hook  w^as  designed  to  prevent,  it  would  not 
fully  attain  the  objects  desired.  It  thus  appears  of  the  235  war 
steamers  of  tlie  British  navy,  (built  and  buikling,)  but  30,  rated  from 
70  to  120  guns,  draw  too  much  water  for  the  swash  cliannel.  Of  that 
navy  there  are,  besides  numerous  smaller  vessels,  70  sail  sliips  between 
the  rates  of  30  and  60  guns,  principally  42's,  44's,  and  50's,  whose 
draughts  are  not  too  great  for  this  channel,  as  exhibited  on  the  pub- 
lished charts,  and  we  learn  from  the  latest  resurveys  that  ships-of- 
war,  even  of  the  largest  size,  may  safel}^  pass  through  it. 

From  all  theses  considerations  I  deem  it  advisable  that  as  large  ap- 
propriations should  now  be  made  for  the  completion  of  the  works  at 
the  Narrows  and  Throg's  Neck  as  can  be  advantageously  expended, 
and  that  the  work  at  Sandv  Hook  should  be  considered  secondarv, 
and  either  be  postponed  until  after  the  completion  of  the  works  just 
mentioned,  or  prosecuted  at  the  same  time,  if  appropriations  can  be 
made  therefor  without  interfering  with  the  rapid  construction  of  thos(.' 
herein  presented  as  of  primary  importance. 

It  may  be  well,  in  this  connexion,  to  remark  that  the  use  of  steam 
to  propel  war  vessels,  and  the  heavy  calibre  of  the  armament,  even  of 
the  smaller  vessels,  have  given  a  new  value  to  permanent  fortifica- 
tions and  seem  to  have  rendered  them  indispensable  where  field-works 
would  formerly  have  sufficed.  The  contrary  o])inion  has  lecently  be- 
come popular,  and,  if  permitted  to  fasten  itself  in  the  public  mind, 
may  have  a  pernicious  influence  upon  the  defence  of  our  sea  coast. 
The  idea  is  prevalent  with  many  who  have  not  attentively  examined 
or  closely  studied  the  circumstances  that  are  supposed  to  support  the 
opinion,  that  temporary  earth  works  are  better  able  to  resist  the  de- 
structive power  of  the  new  armaments  of  steamers  than  permanent 
works,  and  should  be  substituted  for  them.  This  opinion  has  grown 
out  of,  or  derives  its  principal  support  from,  the  brilliant  and  pro- 
tracted defence  of  Sevastopol  by  works  thrown  up  on  the  occasion 
under  the  skill  and  energy  of  the  Russian  engineer  Todtleben  ;  and^ 


FORTIFICATIONS  FOR  TIIK  FROPER 


apparently  sustained  by  his  professional  reputation,  is  calculated  to 
do  i^reat  harm. 

With  steam  vessels,  the  attacking  fleet  may  select  calm  weather,  so 
that  the  accuracy  of  their  fire  will  not  he  disturbed  by  the  motion  on 
the  wave,  may  stand  in  nearer  to  the  defensive  works  than  would  be 
hazarded  by  sail  vessels,  and  with  guns  of  the  heavy  calibre  now  used 
and  the  increased  accui'acy  of  fire  due  to  a  steady  deck,  earth  works 
l)attered  at  short  i-anges  would  be  promptly  reduced.  Hollow  shot, 
which  break  harmlessly  against  the  masonry  of  a  y)ermanent  work, 
from  the  fire  cf  a  steamer  at  close  distance  penetrate  deeply  the  earth 
parapets  of  field  works,  and,  exploding  wliere  thus  buried,  rapidly 
destroy  them.  So  of  solid  shot,  the  ])enetration  of  which  is  much 
less  in  tiie  more  solid  and  durable  i'am[)art  of  tlie  ])ermanent  work 
than  in  the  loosely  aggregated  earthen  parapet  of  the  field  work. 
The  problem  for  the  engineer  now  is,  how  to  increase  the  strength  of 
permanent  woi-ks  so  as  to  keep  pace  with  the  increased  destructive- 
ness  of  artiller}'. 

The  foregoing  views  differ  in  some  respects  from  those  contained  in 
the  I'cport  of  the  chief  engineer,  and  the  diffidence  with  which  I  dis- 
sent from  any  opinion  of  his  on  such  subjects  has  only  been  overcomo 
by  the  necessity  imposed  on  me  by  the  resolution  to  report  my  own 
views. 

Referring  to  the  estimates  contained  in  the  report  of  the  chief  en- 
gineer for  the  amount  of  appropriation  which  will  be  required  for  the 
several  woiks  therein  ])roposed, 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JEFF'N  DAVIS, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Hon.  J.  D.  Bright, 

Premdent  of  the  Senate. 


Engineer  Department, 
Washmgton,  February  14,  1856. 

Sir:  A  resolution  of  the  Senate,  of  the  11th  instant,  in  relation  to 
additional  fortifications  for  New  York  harbor,  having  been  sent  to  this 
office  for  report,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  what  follows: 

The  resolution  requests  the  Secretary  of  War  "  report  to  the  Senate 
whether  any,  and  if  any,  luhat,  additional  fortifications  are  necessary 
for  the  proper  defence  and  protection  of  the  city  and  harbor  of  New 
York,  and.  of  the  navy  yard  and  public  property  at  Broohlynf" 

Thei-e  are  tw^o  distinct  channels  to  the  interior  of  this  harbor,  with 
draught  enough  in  each  for  the  largest  vessels  of  war,  namely:  Ist, 
The  entrance  at  the  south,  between  Sandy  Hook  and  Long  Island  ; 
and,  2d,  That  at  the  east,  by  the  way  of  Long  Island  sound. 

These  are  for  a  floating  force.  There  is  a  third  avenue,  which  can 
be  followed  by  a  land  ibrce  only ;  but  which  is  so  short  and  easy  as  to 
need  defence  not  less  than  the  others. 

I  sliall  briefly  mention  the  existing  fortifications  on  each  route, 
and  those  required  in  addition : 


DEFENCE  OF  NEW  YORK  AND  BROOKLYN. 


7 


1.  Pa.ssarje  by  Sandy  Hook. — The  defences  most  remote  from  the 
city,  on  this  line  of  approach,  are  those  at  the  ""  Narrows"  about 
eeven  miles  below  the  lower  point  of  the  city.  These  consist  of  Forts 
Hamilton  and  Lafayette,  on  the  Long  Island  side,  and  batteries 
Hudson  and  Morton,  on  Staten  Island — all  finished  and  efficient 
works.  On  the  Staten  Island  side,  there  is,  moreover,  a  work  in 
progress,  called  Fort  Richmond;  and  there  is  needed,  in  addition,  at 
this  passage  the  rej)air,  perhaps  the  reconstruction  almost,  of  Fort 
Tompkins,  a  work  begun  by  the  State  of  New  York  in  1810,  but 
never  finished. 

Quite  near  tlie  lower  point  of  the  city,  and  as  a  second  line  for  the 
defence  of  this  passage,  there  are  fortifications  on  Governor's,  Bed- 
low's,  and  Ellis'  islands.  In  this  part  of  the  harbor  there  should  be 
recalled  into  the  general  service,  and  suitably  armed  in  case  of  danger. 
Castle  Clinton,  (Castle  Garden.)  It  occupies  a  good  position,  may 
soon  be  put  in  good  condition,  and  made  to  supply  twenty-six  guns 
of  the  largest  calibre.  No  new  permanent  fortifications  have  been 
proposed  to  be  added  to  this  second  line. 

The  lower  harbor,  that  is  to  say,  all  that  broad  water  lying  between 
the  narrows  and  Sandy  Hook — one  of  the  best  roadsteads  on  the  At- 
tantic  coast — is  entirely  without  defences,  its  entrance  being  as  open 
to  an  enemy  as  to  ourselves.  And  its  possession  by  a  8U])erior  naval 
power,  whicli  could  not  now  be  disputed,  w^ould  effect  a  perfect  block- 
ade of  the  city  throughout  all  seasons  of  the  year. 

On  studying  this  subject  some  thirty-five  years  ago,  the  board  of 
engineers  regarded  the  importance  of  closing  this  outer  entrance  as  so 
great,  that  they  pi-ojected  for  the  purpose,  in  addition  to  works  to  be 
erected  during  war  upon  Sandy  Hook  itself,  two  large  casemated  forts, 
to  be  founded  u})on  shoals  outside  of  the  Hook,  estimated  to  cost  each 
$1,680,000. 

Minute  surveys  since  made  of  those  shoals  afi:brd  so  many  reasons 
to  doubt  their  stability,  that  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  confine 
the  projects  for  defence  to  Sandy  Hook,  it  being  proposed  to  erect 
thereon  a  strong  permanent  fortification,  for  which  work  appropria- 
tions have,  for  many  years,  been  solicited  by  this  department. 

The  necessity  for  such  a  work  to  shut  the  lower  harbor  u[)  from  an 
enemy's  occupation  relates  not  alone  to  the  perfect  blockade  that  its 
possession  would  enable  liim  to  maintain  throughout  all  seasons  ol' 
the  year,  but  it  relates  also  to  the  landing  place  within  eight  miles 
of  the  navy  yard  and  Brooklyn  heights,  that  its  possession  would 
allow  him  to  take  advantage  of  at  anv  moment. 

The  short  and  easy  route  for  a  land  force,  be(ore  mentioned,  is  from 
this  landing  in  Gravesend  bay,  which,  though  quite  practicable  while 
covered  by  a  fleet  in  the  bay,  would  be  a  very  hazardous,  if  not  im- 
practicable, enterj)rise  were  the  enemy's  fleet  excluded  by  fortifications 
on  the  Hook.  Beyond  Gravesend  bay  the  southern  coast  of  Long 
Island  is  so  covered  by  shallow  bays  and  marshes  that  a  landing  in 
any  portion  of  it  would  hardly  be  undertaken  in  the  lace  of  defensive 
arrangements  that  a  short  time  would  suffice  to  prepare. 

A  lort  on  Sandy  Hook,  which,  by  the  range  of  its  own  fire  and  that 
of  batteries,  afloat  and  asliore,  under  its  protection,  would  control  all 


s 


FORTIFICATIONS  FOR  THE  PROPER 


the  lower  part  of  the  outer  harbor,  would  also  contribute  materially 
to  the  defence  of  the  passage,  should  a  fleet  attempt  to  force  its  way 
up  to  the  city  and  navy  yard,  since  the  main  shij)  channel,  including 
Gedney's  channel,  ])ass(;s  within  effective  range. 

2.  J^a^scHjc  btj  the  '-East  river''  from  Long  Island  sou7id.—H\\\B 
channel  is  now  defended  by  Fort  Schuyler,  a  strong  work,  nearly 
completed,  on  Throg's  Neck,"  at  a  narrow  pass  in  the  East  river, 
about  sixteen  or  eighteen  miles  from  the  city. 

It  is  pro})Osed,  in  addition,  to  erect  a  fort  on  the  Long  Island  .  ide 
of  the  East  river,  and  o])posite  Fort  Schuyler.  The  two  forts  will 
atford  a  very  secure  defence  to  that  channel. 

But  these  two  forts,  besides  commanding  the  water  })assage,  w^ill 
have  a  very  controlling  action  upon  any  attempt  upon  Brooklyn 
heights  or  the  navy  yard  by  a  land  force  moving  on  Long  Island  from 
a  landing  either  on  its  north  or  south  shore,  since  any  number  of  our 
own  troops  arriving  from  tlie  north  could,  under  their  cover,  be  passed 
over  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  any  sucli  expedition.  A  march  on  the 
main  land  down  u])on  the  city  from  a  landing  distant  some  twenty 
miles,  wliich  these  forts  would  compel,  with  the  unfordable  Spiken- 
devil  creek  in  front,  and  a  very  populous  country  in  rear,  would  be 
(j^ifite  out  of  the  question. 

Even  Fort  Schuyler  alone  partially  acoom4)lishes  the  same  objects 
so  long  as  it  holds  the  channels  sate.  Tlie  construction  of  a  fort  on 
the  opposite  shore  may  less  injuriously  be  j)ostponed,  and  is  of  less 
pressing  importance,  therefore,  than  Sandy  Hook. 

The  complete  system  of  permanent  defences  for  New  York  harbor 
requires,  then,  the  erection  of  the  following  fortifications :  a  fort  on 
Sanky  Hook,  the  rebuilding  of  Fort  Tompkins,  Staten  Island,  and  a 
fort  on  the  East  river  opposite  Fort  Schuyler. 

Should  there  be  no  special  reasons  for  desiring  the  earliest  possible 
completion  of  the  system,  new  operations  may  now  be  restricted  to  the 
first  position  above  named.  The  total  cost  of  the  fort  projected  for 
Sandy  Hook  is  estimated,  at  present  prices,  at  11,500,000 ;  and  an 
appropriation  should  now  be  granted  of  $250,000,  in  order  to  secure  a 
certain  amount  of  efficiency  at  an  early  day. 

Any  i)articular  concern  as  to  the  condition  of  our  foreign  relations 
should,  however,  cause  the  commencement  of  both  the  other  works 
without  delay  by  an  appropriation  of  not  less  than  $150,000  for  each. 

The  cost  of  rebuilding  Fort  Tompkins  has  not  been  calculated,  be- 
cause the  extent  to  which  the  old  structure  and  the  old  materials  may 
now  be  used  can  only  be  known  as  the  work  advances.  The  cost  was 
roughly  estimated  at  $450, 000  many  years  ago,  including  repairs  then 
required  to  adjacent  batteries.  The  battery  repairs  have  since  been 
made,  but  I  am  of  opinion  that,  with  the  diflerence  of  prices,  placing 
these  ruins  in  the  state  of  efficiency  demanded  by  the  position  and  the 
object,  can  not  be  set  down  at  a  less  cost  than  $600,000. 

The  estimate  made  thirty  years  since,  for  the  w^oik  to  stand  oppo- 
site Fort  Schuyler,  was  $686,000.  The  rise  in  prices  of  labor  and 
materials  since  should  raise  this  estimate  to  $850,000,  To  recapitu- 
late— 


DEFENCE  OP  NEW  YORK  AND  BROOKLYN. 


9 


1.  This  report  recommends  the  commenceraent  of  a  fort  on  Sandy 
Hook,  by  an  appropriation  of  $250,000;  total  cost  §1,500,000. 

2.  The  commencement  of  repairs  on  Fort  Tompkins,  Statea  Island, 
by  an  appropriation  of  $150,000;.  total  cost  $600,000. 

3.  The  commencement  of  a  new  fort  opposite  Fort  Schuyler,  on  the 
East  river,  by  an  appropriation  of  $150,000  ;  total  cost  $850,000. 

The  above  works  to  be  begun  in  the  order  of  arrangement — the  first 
mentioned  without  delay.  In  case  of  a  supposed  urgency,  all  to  be 
begun  at  once. 

This  report  also  recommends  the  restoration  to  the  defensive  system 
in  due  time^  and  the  refitting  and  re-arming,  of  Castle  Clinton — now 
known  as  Castle  Garden. 

It  recommends,  moreover — supposing  such  matters  to  fall  within 
the  scope  of  the  Senate's  inquiry — the  putting  and  keeping  in  order 
and  readiness,  as  to  defensive  strength  arid  armament,  all  existing 
works;  and  the  completion,  promptly,  of  those  under  construction. 
The  estimates  lately  submitted  to  Congress  by  the  War  Department  in- 
clude the  sum  of '$'75,000  for  Fort  Richmond,  and  $42,300  for  the 
necessary  extension  of  the  site  of  the  ibrts  on  Staten  Island.  The 
senior  engineer  in  the  harbor  of  New  York  presented  besides — but  not 
in  time  lor  them  to  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  with  other 
annual  estimates — a  call  for  $15,000  for  Fort  Schuyler;  $00,000  for 
the  completion  of  Fort  Wood  and  the  sea  wall  of  Bedlow's  Island; 
$4,000  for  repairs  of  Fort  Columbus;  $7,000  for  repairs  and  wharf  at 
Fort  Hamilton;  and  $2,000  for  completing  magazine  at  battery  Hud- 
son— all  which  sums  1  believe  to  be  necessary  for  the  due  preparation 
and  preservation  of  the  works  mentioned. 

On  the  actual  approach  of  a  war  with  a  maritime  power,  much  will 
remain  to  be  done  by  impromptu  resorts — such  as  temporary  batteries 
under  the  shelter  of  permanent  forts,  for  the  augmentation  of  fire 
upon  important  points  ;  the  erection  of  block  houses,  towers,  &c.,  to 
guard  landing  places  and  passes,  and  cover  advanced  batteries,  &c. 
But  while  many  important  aids  will  undoubtedly  be  thus  supplied,  it 
will  not  be  easy  to  say,  long  before  hand,  what,  nor  v/here,  they  must 
be.  To  a  great  extent  the  nature  and  number  of  these  resorts  must  de- 
pend on  the  then  condition  of  the  permanent  defences. 

I  say  nothing  of  the  floating  aids  to  the  system  of  permanent  de- 
fences, since  no  inquiry  is  made  as  to  these.  They  will  be  important 
auxiliaries  in  some  respects,  and  in  certain  positions;  but  as  to  these 
also,  it  would  be  useless  now  to  specify  either  their  number  or  their 
nature.  We  know,  however,  with  certainty,  that  the  resources  of 
such  a  city  as  New  York  will  quickly  supply  almost  unlimited  means 
of  this  kind,  whenever  thev  mav  be  wanted  as  means  of  defence  within 
its  waters. 

Returning  the  resolution  herewith,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very 
respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN, 
Brevet  Brigadier  General  and  Colonel  Engineers. 
Hon.  Jefferson  Davis, 

Secrefarij  of  War, 
Ex.  Doc.  36  2 


i£x  ICtbrta 


SEYMOUR  DURST 


-± '  'Tort  nleAtw  ^im^erdamx-  of  Je  HarJiatarus 


FORT   NEW  AM.STEFJ>AM. 


(MEW  YORK)  ,  1651. 


"When  you  leave,  please  leave  this  hook 

Because  it  has  heen  said 
"Ever'thing  comes  t'  him  who  waits 

Except  a  loaned  hook." 


Avery  Architectural  and  Fine  Arts  Library 
Gift  of  Seymour  B.  Durst  Old  York  Library 


■ 


